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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

VERNESSA REED,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
Case No. 890446
MERRILL W. REED, KEITH REED,
GEORGA REED AND JOHN DOES
1 THROUGH 15,
Defendants/Appellants.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF ^ROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from an Order arid Judgment concerning a
Motion to Quash Service.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3 (1986 amended).
ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether

a trial

court erred in denying the Defendant's

Motion to Quash Service given that the sjervice was delivered at
the residence of the Defendant's parents ^nd not the residence of
the Defendant.

DETERMINATIVE RULES
Rule 4(e)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
(e) Personal service in state. Personal service within
the state shall be as follows:
(1) Upon a natural person of the age of 14
years or over, by delivering a copy thereof
to him personally, or by leaving such copy at
this usual place of abode with some person of
suitable age and discretion there residing;
or by delivering a copy to an agent
authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedings.

This

appeal

is

from

the

ruling

of

Judge

Cullen

Y.

Christensen dated October 3, 1988 and from the amended default
judgment against Keith Reed only, dated November 2, 1988.
Order

and

Judgment

resolving

the

issues between

The

the other

litigants in the matter was signed by the Honorable Cullen Y.
Christensen on July 11, 1989. A Motion for Amendment of Judgment
under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was filed by
the Plaintiff against the Defendants Merrill W. Reed and Georga
Reed on June 20, 1989 with the response being filed by Georga
Reed and Merrill Reed on July 5, 1989.

No decision has been

entered on the Motion to Amend the Judgment.

But that Motion

does not affect the determination of the Court relative to Keith
Reed's Motion to Quash Service.
The Appellant, Keith Reed, appeals from the Court's ruling
2
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of
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claimed

their son had left the State of Utah (Addendum A ) .
The Plaintiff and the Defendant were separated some time
during June 1986, and were divorced on or about April 15, 1987.
(Addendum A, paragraph 4 ) .

Thereafter, the Plaintiff claim to

have seen the Defendant a couple of times during May 1988, at
which time the Defendant was allegedly driving a pickup truck
purportedly

owned by his parents

(Addendum A, paragraph 5 ) .

Treasa Norton, the daughter of the Plaintiff and the Defendant
also claimed to have seen the Defendant once at the end of April
1988 under similar circumstances (Addendum A, paragraph 5 ) .
The parents of the Defendant reside at 254 North 300 East,
Orem, Utah 84057 (Addendum A, paragraph 7). Some time prior to
April 15 of 1987 and 1988, the Defendant listed his parents'
address on his income tax returns.

(Addendum A, paragraph 9 ) .

The trial court found that the Defendant became aware of the
service of process about a month after his parents were served.
(Addendum A, paragraph 10).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in denying the Defendant's Motion to
Quash

Service

and

in ordering

Defendant for several reasons.
Rules

of Civil

Procedure

default judgment

against the

First, according to the Utah

and Utah

case

law,

it

is

proper

compliance with the formalities of process is a prerequisite to
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court should be reversed and the Defendant should be allowed to
defend himself in this action.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO QUASH SERVICE BECAUSE THAT SERVICE WAS MADE UPON
THE DEFENDANT'S PARENTS AND NOT UPON THE DEFENDANT.
A.

Proper compliance with the formalities of service is a
prerequisite to invoking jurisdiction of a court and to
acquiring jurisdiction over a defendant.

It is one of the most fundamental rules of civil procedure
that before any court can exercise jurisdiction over a party,
there must be proper issuance and service of summons.

Murdock v.

Blake, 402 P.2d 164 (Utah 1971) Utah Sand and Gravel Products v.
Tolbert,

402

District

Court, 495 P.2d

Court

P. 2d

summarized

703

(Utah
1262

1965);

Lloyd

(Utah

1972).

the importance of proper

v.

Third

The Utah
service

Judicial
Supreme

as follows:

the proper issuance and service of a summons which is
the means of invoking the jurisdiction of the court and
of acquiring jurisdiction of the defendant is the
foundation of the lawsuit.
Utah Sand and Gravel
Products v. Tolbert, 402 P.2d 703 (Utah 1965).
Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure outlines the
requisites of proper service that are applicable in the present
case.

Rule 4(e) provides that process may be validly served upon

an individual
by delivering a copy to him personally, or leaving such
copy [i.e., copy of the summons and complaint] at his
usual place of abode with some person of suitable age
and discretion there residing. Utah R. Civ. P. 4(e).

6

Without proper service in the present case, the court would
have no jurisdiction over the Defendant except to uphold his
motion to quash the attempted service.
B.

The residence of the Defendant's parents did not
constitute the Defendant's "usual place of abode"
required by Rule 4(e),

The Defendant in the present case ioes not assert that his
parents are not of suitable age and discretion, but rather, that
the Defendant's
residence

"usual place of abode" was not his parents'

at the time

service was

attempted.

Thus, it is

necessary to determine what is meant by jthe term "usual place of
abode"

as set forth in Rule 4(e).

bne of the Plaintiff's

arguments is that since the Defendant Hi

his parents' address

on his income tax forms, this is sufficient to constitute the
Defendant's "usual place of abode."

However, at the time the

Sheriff left the Summons and Complaint at the parent's residence,
the parents informed the Sheriff that th^ Defendant did not live
there.

Moreover, the Affidavits taken in the course of these

proceedings affirm that the Defendant Was not living at his
parent's home when the service was maae.

In Stan Katz Real

Estate Inc. v. Chavez, 565 P.2c 1142, Justice Crockett emphasized
the seriousness which should be given ^o affidavit testimony:
It is my view that the defendant's statement in his
affidavit under oath that he did not reside at that
address and had not received thp summons stands
7

unrefuted.
Thus, it seems that while the parent's residence may have
been the Defendant's last known address according to his income
tax forms, it was not his present address at the time service was
attempted.
In delineating what is required for proper service, the Utah
Supreme Court explained that delivering summons to a person's
last known address does no satisfy the requirement:
Neither 'Notice of the Action' nor summons
the defendant at his last known address
jurisdiction over the defendant."
Lloyd
Judicial District Court, 495 P.2d 1262 (Utah

mailed to
will give
v. Third
1972).

Thus, merely leaving a copy of the Summons and the Complaint
at the parent's residence was not sufficient; particularly since
the Defendant's parents explained that the Defendant no longer
lived with them.

The only possible way this service would have

been valid is if the Defendant's parents were agents of the
Defendant appointed to receive service for him which they were
not.

Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986).

In sum, while

the question of whether a party has been served with process is a
question of fact, Carnes v. Carnes, 668 P.2d 555 (Utah 1983), the
facts

in

the

present

case

show

that

the personal

service

attempted on the Defendant was unsuccessful.
C.

The fact that the pefendant may have had "Notice of the
Present Action" does not remove the formal requirements
for proper service.
8

The Supreme Court of Utah in Murdock v. Blake, 484 P.2d 164
(Utah

1971),

explained

the importance

of complying with the

requirements of personal service whether or not the party to be
served has actual knowledge of the actioii.
for it is service of process, not actual
knowledge of the commencement of the action, which
confers jurisdiction.
Otherwise, a defendant could
never object to the sufficiency of service of process,
since he must have knowledge of th£ suit to make such
objection. The proper issuance and service of summons
cannot be supplanted by mer^ notice by letter,
telephone or any other such means. [emphasis added)
Id. at 167.
Using the Supreme Court's reasoning in Blake, the attempted
service on the Defendant cannot be deemed proper merely because
he may have found out about the action iri some other way, such as
hearing the news from his parents.

Certainly, xhe news of a

summon would travel like wildfire, espebially within a family,
but the rules of civil procedure do not rely and indeed, refuse
to rely on such a haphazard method of infprming parties that they
are being sued.

The Utah Supreme Court ^ias echoed this argument

in other cases.

Lloyd v. Third Judicial District Court, 495 P.2c

1262 (Utah 1972); Utah Sand & Gravel Products Corp. v. Tolbert,
402 P.2d 703 (Utah 1965).
D.

Alternative means should have b^en used to give proper
notice to the Defendant when the attempt at personal
service failed.
9

In Guenther v. Guenther, 749 P.2d 628 (Utah 1988), the Utah
Supreme Court discussed possible alternatives for giving proper
notice to parties who could not be personally served.

The facts

of Guenther are relevant to the facts of the present case.
Guenther, the defendant had resided at his mother's home.
at 630.

In
Id.

However, when the Sheriff attempted personal service on

the defendant at his mother's residence, the defendant's mother
said that she did not have an address for him and that she did
not know of his whereabouts.
unsuccessful

Id.

Following

the Sheriff's

attempts to serve the defendant personally, the

court permitted service by publication and by mailing a copy of
the summons to the defendant's last known address.

Id.

The

Guenther court, stated that the state had an interest in allowing
the plaintiffs to obtain jurisdiction over defendant's who were
in the state, but could not be found and personally served.
at 629.
for

Id.

In furthering that interest, the court gave guidelines

plaintiffs

who

were unsuccessful

in their

attempts

at

personal service:
. . . following [the] Sheriff's unsuccessful attempts
to serve [the] defendant over [an] extended period of
time plaintiff was entitled to move for and obtain an
order authorizing service of [the] summons on [the]
defendant by publication and by mailing copies of
[the] summons to him at his last known address.
Id.

Thus, the

law has provided effective methods to serve

process on difficult-to-find defendants.
10

However, the Plaintiffs

in the present case did no follow any of the alternative methods
provided.

First, the record did not show that the attempts of

personal service on the defendant took place over an "extended
period of time."

Second, the Plaintiff did not even attempt to

obtain an order allowing for publication and service by mail.
In sum, the records and the affidavits taken support the
claim

that

the Defendant

was not residing

residence when personal service was attempted.
attempted

personal

alternative

for

the

service

was

Plaintiff

invalid.
was

to

at his parent's
Therefore, the
The

obtain

only
the

other

Court's

permission to serve the Defendant by publication which they did
not do.

Accordingly, the Defendant's Mprion to Quash should be

upheld.
CONCLUSION
Proper compliance with the requisites of service of process
are fundamental to a court's exercise

of jurisdiction.

The

method of service outlined in the Rules 0f Civil Procedure is to
personally serve a defendant by leaving ^ copy of the summons at
the person's "usual place of abode."

Thp Plaintiff's service at

the residence of the Defendant's parents did not fulfill this
requirement.

Moreover, Utah case law does not support the

argument that the requirements for personal service are waived
merely because the person to be served still receives actual
11

notice.

Finally, the Plaintiff did not follow any of the means

provided to properly serve the Defendant after her unsuccessful
attempt at personal service.
Therefore, the Defendant-Appellant

respectfully

requests

that the portion of the trial court's order and judgment denying
Defendant's Motion to Quash Service and the resulting default
judgment be reversed.
DATED this

^

day of December, 1989.

CJ

X?

RICHARD B. JOHNSON, ESQ
Attorney for Plaintiff
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

(p

day of December, 1989,

I caused to be deposited in the mail four (4) true and correct
copies of the foregoing to the following, postage prepaid.
Glen J. Ellis, Esq.
ELLIS & ELLIS
60 East 100 South, Suite 102
P.O. Box 1097
Provo, Utah 84603
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I3BB OCT -k « 10= 21
DISTRICT COURT OF UTA}I COUNTS
STATE OF UTAH

VERNESSA REED,
Plaintiff,
dase. No. CV-88-927
vs.
RULING
MERRILL W. REED, et al.,
Defendants•

This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 2.8,
on the motion of defendant Keith Reed seeking an order
quashing the service of process u^>on him.

The Court has

reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of counsel,
entertained the proffers and argument of counsel, and upon
being advised i:i the premises, noy makes the following:
FINDINGS
1.

Merrill W. Reed andfceorgaReed are the parents

of Keith Reed.
2.

Keith Reed was purportedly served on May 8,

1988, with process by leaving the same with said parents
under the assumption that the residence of the parents was
"the usual place of abode1' of Keith Reed (Rule 4(e) (l)URCP.) ;
that said parents have disavowed any knowledge of the whereabouts of Keith Reed.
3.

Defendants, by affidavit, have affirmed that

at the time of the purported service, Keith Reed did not

reside with his parents; that said parents have claimed that
Keith Reed had left the State of Utah (Norton affidavit).
4.

That plaintiff and defendant Keith Reed were

divorced on or about April 15, 1987; that said parties
separated during or about the month of June, 1986.
5.

That plaintiff personally observed Keith Reed

in Provo, Utah on May 7, 1988, driving a 1976 Ford pickup
truck which truck said parents claim to own, and which truck
is one of the subjects of controversy in this action; that
plaintiff again personally observed Keith Reed in Provo,
Utah on May 12, 1988.
6.

That Keith Reed was personally seen in the

vicinity of Orem, Utah on April 26, 1988 by Treasa Norton,
daughter of the plaintiff, and Keith Reed was at said time
driving said truck.
7.

That the said parents of Keith Reed reside at

254 North 300 East, Orem, Utah
8.

84057.

That sometime prior to April 15, 1987, Keith

Reed filed income tax returns for the year 1986 upon which
his address was stated as being 254 North 300 East, Orem,
Utah

84057.
9.

That sometime prior to April 15, 1988 and after

February 5, 1988, the said Keith Reed filed income tax
returns for the year 1986 upon which his address was stated

as being 254 North 300 East, OremJ Utah
10.

84057.

That no l a t e r than 4^ne 8, 1988, Keith Reed

became #ware of the process served upon h i s parents on May
8, 1988,
DISCUSSION
The Court is of the view that "domicile11 and "usual
place of abode11 for the purposes pf the service of process
are not synonymous.
As stated in Grant vs. Lawrence, 37 Ut. 450, 108
P.931,
"Usual place of abode is sometimes referred to as
being synonymous with domicile or permanent residence.
In our judgment there is a btoad distinction between
domicile and usual place of ^bode as the latter term
is used in our statute. Suclji also seems to be the
conclusion reached by the authorities. . .
That is, where a person Abides -- lives -- at the
particular time when the summons is served, constitutes
his usual place of abode. A similar question was before
the Supreme Court of the United States in Earle v.
McVeigh, 91 U.S., where at pige 508 (23 L. Ed. 398),
it is held that, "usual plac^ of abode," such service,
in order to constitute legal service, must be made at
the defendant's "then present residence." In other
words, at the place where th£ defendant then lives or
abides. . ."
It thus becomes a question of fact to be determined
by the Court (Carnes vs. Carnes, 668 P.2d 555) and for which
purpose tYte evidentiary hearing ox September 26, 19&& \*as
convened.
However, as further stated in Carnes, Supra:
"Although a sheriff's return of process is presumptively
correct and is prima facie evidence of the facts stated

therein, the invalidity or absence of service of process
can be shown by clear and convincing evidence,"
and as stated in Guenther vs. Guenther, 749 P. 2d 628, in a
situation somewhat analogous to the one now before the Court:
"Defendant's interest to be appraised of the pendency
of the action against him by personal service upon him
is outweighed by the state's interest that persons

using the state's

courts,

such as plaintiff,

be

allowed

to maintain their actions and obtain jurisdiction over
defendants who are in the state but who cannot after
the exercise of due diligence, be found and personally
served.11
It also appears to the Court that the Rules with
respect to service of process are to be liberally construed
to insure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action, as long as a party is actually apprised of the
pendency of an action (Rule 1(a) URCP).
In the case of Nowell vs. Nowell, 384 F.2d 951,
32 ALR 3rd 107, the Fifth Federal Circuit Court in construing
similar language of "dwelling house or usual place of abode"
under the Federal Rules stated:
"The appropriate construction of Rule 4(d)(1) varies
according to whether the defendant received notice of
the suit. 4(d)(1) should be broadly construed where
the defendant, as in this case, received notice of the
suit. This rule of construction is, of course, subject
to the limitation that the construction of the statute's
language must be a natural rather than an artificial
one. Frasca vs. Eubank. DC Pa. 1959, 24 FRD 268. Other-

vise, no hard and fast

rule can be fashioned

to

determine

what is or is not a party's 'dwelling house or usual

place of abode1 within the nklefs meaning; rather the
practicalities of the particular fact situation determine
whether service meets the requirements of 4(d)(1).
11
. . . the provision concerning usual place of abode
should be liberally construed to effectuate service if
actual notice has been received by the defendant and
that in the last analysis th$ question of service must
be resolved by 'what best selves to give notice to a
defendant that he is being served with process, considering the situation from a practical standpoint.'
u
. . .ftovins^ivs.ftowe,C.C.A.feth 19U2, 133 1131}
F.2d 687 . . . ."
Based upon the foregoing, the Court further finds
and concludes as follows:
11.

Defendant has not ptoduced clear and convincing

evidence to overcome the presumptively correct service of
process.
12.

That defendant has been fully apprised of the

pendency of the proceedings against him.
13.

That a just, speedy and inexpensive deter-

mination of this action dictates tfhat defendant should be
required to answer the complaint cj>f the plaintiff.
14.

That defendants motion to quash should be

denied.
RULING
15.

That defendant's motion to quash service of

process be and the same is hereby denied.
Dated thisj^^^

day of October 1988.

BY THE COURT:

Culllen^T Christensen, Judge

